Empire, Technology and Seapower by Howard J. Fuller

Author:Howard J. Fuller [Fuller, Howard J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Naval, Europe, Great Britain, General, Modern, 19th Century
ISBN: 9781134200443
Google: 0kt_AgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-01-03T01:21:41+00:00

19 ‘The means by which we shall again be able to catch the bird in his own net’

Perhaps the previous obsession with safely ‘out-ranging’ the Russian shore defences had blinded post-war British tacticians and early ironclad designers? Captain Fishbourne had been certain at the beginning of 1859 that the ‘principle of Armstrong’s gun is so correct, and the details of its carriage-slide and missiles so simple and complete, that it will be the work of but a short time to satisfy the most incredulous as to their great value’. Here their primacy lay in the ability ‘of throwing shot into embrasures, of hitting a narrow and definite line for breaching purposes, or of throwing shot into ships’ ports, or of hitting them “between wind and water” ’. Sitting in the audience that evening was Sir William himself, who could only concur ‘as to the importance of a steady platform’.1 Two years later, and the Institution of Naval Architects was rife with debate on ‘Iron-Cased Vessels of War’, in a two-day session chaired by Sir John Pakington. The first paper read, by General Sir Howard Douglas, was an ‘artillery-man’s’ response to the critiques made by iron shipbuilders with whom he had taken issue. In the pursuit of high speed, massive iron-hulled ships made themselves increasingly less practical men-of-war. Britain’s naval supremacy ‘might possibly thus be tampered with by a speculative philosophy, which would prescribe to our descendants the mode and means of warfare for a remote future’. Renowned engineer and iron shipbuilder Joseph d’Aguilar Samuda was glad that the new Hector and Valiant would finally see fully armoured British ironclads, ‘the Admiralty having now recognized the deficiency of their original plan and started to correct it in the right, improvement may be looked for in each successive production’.2 J. Scott Russell, however, the famed builder of Brunel’s Great Eastern, followed this up by stressing that a ‘perfect’ ironclad (combining invincible strength, irresistible hitting power, high-speeds and steadiness) was physically impossible, ‘for all shipbuilding is a matter of compromise’. The sailor could tell the engineer what he wanted in a warship. After that, hard choices had to be made. Russell at least considered the ‘distinguished position in the new era of naval tactics and of naval construction which we now see before us’ as hinging on the real strength of the country: ‘its power of rapid production’. Yet while the volunteer corps and the army’s drive for new coastal fortifications had demonstrated the British people’s resolve, ‘our supremacy on the sea which is vital to our national prosperity … remains still in a condition to be questioned’. This expression was significant; Britain’s success was maritime-based, and whereas the colonies or other imperial dominions might require local protection from attacks, overseas trade itself was both more valuable and vulnerable. The nation had ‘slumbered’ in its false belief in ‘wooden walls’ when it should have been building more ironclads – more Warriors. Having a stake in her design, along with Pakington’s Admiralty, Russell hoped

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